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Abstract 
 
Under what conditions do politicians oppose referendums especially to decide questions of European 
integration? Existing literature has identified reasons why governments and political parties pledge to 
hold non-mandatory referendums to ratify EU treaties or determine a country's participation in the EU 
project, and some studies have analysed the effect of voter demand and attitudes towards EU 
referendums. This study examines the positions politicians themselves take towards popular 
participation in decision-making on the EU. The paper presents a summative content analysis of 
parliamentary debates in the United Kingdom between 1974 and 2010, tracing MPs' arguments 
against using referendums to determine the UK's participation in EU integration. Our results indicate 
that the range of claims made by MPs in the House of Commons against referendums on European 
matters has narrowed over time, although opposing arguments have continued to fall into the same set 
of four argumentative strategies. We find that institutional arguments, reflecting a Burkean 
understanding of representative democracy, consistently predominate over arguments that cite 
practical, political and manipulation concerns. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on direct participation identifies several reasons why governments and political 
parties commit to holding referendums on EU matters when referendums are not constitutionally 
required (see Bjørklund 1982; Lijphart 1984; Butler and Ranney 1994; Bogdanor 1994; Closa 2007; 
Morel 1993, 2001, 2007; Schneider and Cederman 1996; Hug 2002, 2004; Qvortrup 2002, 2006; 
Tridimas 2007; King 2007; Finke and König 2009; Dür and Matteo 2011). Lijphart, for instance, 
argues that governments only submit issues to referendums if they are certain that they will win 
(1984: 204). King suggests that governments hold referendums only when they believe that the 
popular vote will likely provide a useful ad hoc solution to a particular political problem, such as 
resolving internal party divisions (2007: 279). For Morel (2001) and Hug (2002), referendums may be 
used to pass treaties that would otherwise not be ratified or they may be de facto obligatory even 
when they are not constitutionally required (as in Norway in 1994 and France in 2005). Schneider and 
Weitsman (1996) argue that governments may hold referendums to reinforce their bargaining position 
in the EU. 
In light of these studies, one could explain why governments do not defer decision-making to 
the people with reference to the absence of the conditions identified in the literature. But a relevant 
source of information is the qualitative arguments used by political elites themselves against 
referendums. While much has been written about how voters approach referendums on European 
matters (see Hug and Sciarini 2000; Gary et al. 2005; Widfeldt 2004), little research has examined 
how politicians themselves conceive the issue or at least what stances on the subject they might make 
explicit (see Binzer-Holbot 2006). This lacuna is significant because: (a) one of the main obstacles to 
the legitimisation of the EU has often been identified as politicians’ reluctance to let citizens involve 
themselves in, or simply express themselves on, the European project (see Wallace and Smith 1995), 
and (b) the ways in which political representatives perceive their own roles, and those of the people, 
are crucial to our understanding of the construction and development of the European Union (see 
Magnette 2003; Chadwick and May 2003). 
Rather than offering normative insights into why governments refuse referendums (see 
Qvortrup 2002, 2007; LeDuc 2003; Kaufman and Waters 2004), we approach the question empirically 
by examining the rhetorical strategies deployed by politicians to argue against direct participation on 
European matters. The cases considered here are successive parliamentary debates in the UK on 
whether to hold referendums to ratify key European treaties or deal with the relationship between the 
UK and the EU more broadly from 1974 to 2010.  
Our results show that over time the range of claims used by political representatives to argue 
against the use of the referendum has narrowed while the claims have consistently fallen into four key 
argumentation types, which we have coined institutional, practical and political arguments and 
manipulation issues. The results also reveal the predominance of institutional arguments over the 
three other types of argumentative strategies. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in the remainder of the introduction we look at the 
constitutional foundations of the cases for and against direct participation and we justify the use of 
parliamentary debates as a source of data. In Section 2, we describe our method of analysis and 
corpus. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 offers a reflection on the findings. In the 
conclusion, we draw on the typology of arguments and the analytical framework developed in this 
study to propose some additional avenues for research. 
1.1 Constitutional foundations of the cases for or against direct participation 
The constitutional foundation of the case for the referendum in the UK is that if a proposed 
reform is thought to involve constitutional changes of great magnitude, the decision to adopt it (or 
not) should be given to the people. This criterion is in line with a Lockean rather than a Burkean view 
of democracy. According to John Locke, the establishment of a representative democracy implies not 
that the people have given up their rights in absolute terms, but that they have simply transferred the 
execution of their rights legitimately to another body in the form of a concessio imperii: a temporary 
and limited delegation of power. Although representatives have a vested authority, it is ultimately 
owed to the people. Giving greater weight to parliamentary sovereignty than to popular sovereignty is 
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inconceivable, since the former is granted by the latter. When matters of great importance arise, 
deferring decision-making to the people is a duty (see Locke 1690, Second Treatise, Art. 242). 
The constitutional foundation of the case against the referendum is based on the notion that 
parliamentary sovereignty is derived from the Crown, to which all citizens are subject. The political 
tradition of representative democracy invests MPs with the duty to represent the best interests of the 
country, i.e. the Crown, rather than act as popular delegates. This distinction was touched upon by 
Edmund Burke in his now famous speech to his Bristol electorate on November 3rd, 1774. The 
representative is expected to exercise his informed judgment of the country’s best interest and not be 
swayed by transient constituent opinions. In this light, direct or participatory forms of democracy are 
at odds with representative democracy. 
If we accept Samuel Beer’s conception of political culture as a dialectic between opposing 
bodies of thought (1965: 11), the political culture of political representation and democratic decision-
making in the UK can be characterised in terms of Burke versus Locke, whereby the thoughts of the 
former on representation still resonate in arguments issued against direct participation while those of 
the latter on sovereignty (more precisely, on the transfer of sovereignty) continue to be inherent in 
arguments made for direct decision-making by the people. 
1.2 Parliamentary deliberations as data 
Investigating the position of politicians on popular participation is not easy. MPs could be 
invited to complete surveys or be interviewed but, in addition to well-known problems of elite 
interviews (i.e. access), these methods are unsuitable for observing retrospectively MPs views over 
time. Parliamentary debates offer a much more promising source of information. 
Despite the centrality of parliamentary institutions, speeches made by elected representatives 
are often dismissed on the grounds that they fail to reflect ‘real interests’. Rational choice 
institutionalists typically argue that political actors have a set of preferences and behave 
instrumentally to maximise their utility in the attainment of these preferences (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
942). In this view, the behaviour of political actors is likely driven primarily by self-interest and 
affected by strategic calculation of how others are likely to behave (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). One 
might therefore consider deliberative assemblies as institutions wherein politicians use language 
instrumentally (i.e. to pass a bill or be re-elected).  
Following this line of reasoning, the language used by representatives in Parliament to defend 
their stance hardly matters as it reflects only strategic calculations, not genuine beliefs. Why, 
therefore, study parliamentary discourse? This question converges with the argument that since 
referendums are controlled and ‘pro-hegemonic’,1 it makes little sense a priori to study what political 
representatives have to say on the issue. 
Yet, the fact that political representatives resort to certain kinds of arguments and dismiss 
others is in itself an important point that deserves close examination. The choice to resort to particular 
rhetorical strategies shows – at the very least – which arguments might be considered legitimate in the 
context of political debates and which are not. This point harks back to the distinction made by 
Quentin Skinner between empirical and conceptual reasons for studying parliamentary debates. At the 
empirical level, Skinner argues, disputes tend to revolve around the question whether ‘speech-acts’ of 
political representatives are sincere. However, this is not the most important question insofar as we 
cannot know with certainty what their real motives are. More interesting is to focus on what 
representatives are actually doing: that is, to consider their intentions in light of what is actually said 
or actioned on their part (Skinner 2002: 145-150). In sum, one could say that transitory beliefs 
become important in political debates only if they find expression. In that sense, the legitimating role 
of language is more important than a representative’s real beliefs. 
                                                     
1
 Referendums are said to be ‘pro-hegemonic’ when they are used by the ruling elites only to strengthen their 
power (see Qvortrup 2002). 
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2 Method of analysis and corpus 
To analyse parliamentary debates we use summative content analysis (see Hsieh and Shannon 
2005). Unlike conventional approaches to qualitative content analysis, summative content analysis 
typically begins by identifying words and measuring their distribution within a corpus. After 
quantification of the manifest content (an exploratory phase) latent content analysis is performed – 
that is, the underlying meanings of words and themes are interpreted. To assist these tasks, we use two 
data analysis software packages: (a) Alceste for the quantification of manifest content via automatic 
descending classification, and (b) NVivo for identifying and manually coding the latent themes 
underlying the manifest content. 
Alceste
2
 relies on co-occurrence analysis, which is the statistical analysis of frequent word 
pairs in a corpus. Within the corpus, homogeneous subsets of words are automatically selected by the 
algorithm on the basis of their occurrence and co-occurrence in sentence segments (Brugidou 2003: 
418). The software identifies statistical similarities and dissimilarities of words in order to classify 
repetitive language patterns. The procedure then leads to the selection of clusters (or classes). The 
program generates a classification of text units according to the pattern of co-occurrences of words 
within sentence segments. Alceste is not a technique for a priori hypothesis testing but for exploration 
and description. Unlike manual methods of qualitative analysis it is insensitive to meaning and 
context. Its advantage is that within a short time the researcher can gain an impression of a 
voluminous data corpus. (For more information about Alceste see Guerin-Pace 1998; Bara et al. 2007; 
Bicquelet et al. 2012; Schonhardt-Bailey 2005.) 
NVivo is a qualitative data analysis management tool. It assists thematic coding and the 
assessment of relationships between themes and variables (in our case, the type of argument and the 
year in which it was expressed).
3
 (For more information about NVivo see Lewins and Silver 2007.) 
Our summative content analysis is thus a hybrid approach. Themes in the corpus are not 
purely generated automatically from the raw data. They do derive initially from the quantification of 
the corpus by Alceste, but are verified for internal consistency and applicability via qualitative reading 
and interpretation. This approach offers several advantages. First, themes do not emerge as artefacts 
based on researcher intuition or many readings of the corpus. Instead, the themes are generated by 
unobtrusive data elicitation based on word frequencies and co-occurrences. Second, the qualitative 
verification avoids hasty, naive interpretations. This step also enables the development of new themes 
overlooked by the automatic approach. Third, the two-step approach increases both the validity and 
the reliability of measurement. Thus the hybrid, or summative, approach to content analysis results in 
a robust coding frame and valid, reliable measurement due to the combination of the rigour of 
quantitative analysis with the depth of qualitative interpretation. 
2.1 Corpus  
Our corpus comprises seven House of Commons debates from 1974 to 2010 concerning 
whether to use referendums to ratify European treaties or to determine the relationship between the 
UK and the EU. While we would have liked to select one key debate per decade, this was not possible 
because debates about the referendum in each decade did not have equal salience. Interest in 
referendums receded in the 1980s due to discontent with the experience of the 1975 referendum. For 
instance, whether to submit the Single European Act in the 1980s to popular vote did not achieve the 
same prominence in debates as did the Maastricht Treaty in the 1990s or the EU Constitutional Treaty 
in the 2000s.
4
 To maintain a balance between the amounts of data for each decade, we included two 
                                                     
2
 ALCESTE stands for Analyse des Lexèmes Co-occurents dans les Énnoncés Simples d’un texte (analysis of the 
co-occurring lexemes within the simple statements of a text). Its algorithm, based on Benzecri’s contributions in 
textual statistics, was created by Max Reinert. 
3
 The full Alceste and NVivo reports produced for this research, the original dataset and the coding scheme are 
available on a webpage dedicated to this study. 
4
 The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties in the late 1990s and early 2000s, respectively, also generated fewer 
discussions about the use of the referendum. 
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debates from the 1980s as well as two from the 2000s on the Ratification of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty Bill (Table 1). 
[Table 1 about here] 
3 Results 
We begin our analysis by looking at the results produced by Alceste for all seven debates 
combined. The software automatically selected six classes of key terms on the basis of term frequency 
and co-occurrences. The hierarchical descending clustering procedure first divided the six classes into 
two clusters (of two and four classes), and then into three clusters (each of two classes) (see Fig. 1). 
Following interpretation and labelling of the classes based on the terms associated with each class as 
well as on our familiarity with the corpus, we conclude that three clusters make substantive sense.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
The top cluster in Fig. 1 is comprised of two classes. As we see from Table 2, the first class 
contains terms such as power, law, court, transfer, sovereign, clause, competence and justice, and the 
second contains treaty, qualified, voting, pillar, Rome, foreign. Those two classes deal respectively 
with the judicial issues and constitutional issues at stake when considering the transfer of 
sovereignty from Parliament to supranational institutions, and we label them accordingly. 
The first class that comprises the middle cluster in Figure 1 contains procedural language 
employed by MPs to address each other and structure their speeches in the House of Commons, i.e. 
Hon, friend, member, Mr, gentlemen. The second class focuses on the issue of the referendum, 
containing key terms such as elect, referendum, people, electorate, question, general, issue. We 
further classify the content of this class below. For the present, it suffices to note that the close link 
between procedural language and the referendum issue reflects the centrality of the latter theme 
within the debates. 
The bottom cluster in Figure 1 is made up of a class containing key terms such as community, 
world, operations, trade, country and budget, which indicate economic issues associated with the EU. 
It is most similar to a class that distinguishes concerns pertaining to agricultural issues with key 
terms such as food, manufacture, price, agriculture, industry and farm.  
The naming and interpretation of the classes produced by Alceste was not (and cannot be) 
simply based on the reading of the most frequent key terms associated with each class. Doing so 
would cause well-known problems of validity, where extracting key words from their context runs the 
high risk of misinterpretation. In order to interpret the software output soundly, we referred to the 
terms in context. These contextual units are ‘gauged sentences that [Alceste] automatically constructs 
based on word length and punctuation in the text’ (Schonhardt-Bailey 2005: 705). 
Our next step is to look closely at the contextual units, or gauged sentences, in the 
Referendum Issue class, focussing on arguments against the use of the referendum. The sentences 
with the highest 𝜒2 value suggested that four main categories of arguments dominated the debates 
across time (see Table 3): 
1.  Institutional arguments point to the danger of introducing referendums in Britain because they 
would alter the UK tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, the Constitution and/or the role 
that representatives have been elected to perform, e.g. “I regard a referendum as being 
difficult to reconcile, even on a matter of this unique character, with responsible 
parliamentary government as we have it in this country.” (D. Lane, 1974, 𝜒2 = 16) 
2.  Political arguments refer to the danger of introducing referendums in Britain because they 
might jeopardise party politics or the government in office, e.g. “In 1972, the Norwegian 
referendum was held, but the result went against the labour government, who resigned.” (T. 
Renton, 1974, 𝜒2 = 28) 
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3.  Practical arguments concern the difficulty of organising or funding a referendum, mobilising 
the electorate or framing a ‘Yes/No’ question, e.g. “Even on such an apparently simple issue 
as in or out of the Community, could the wording of the question sufficiently affect the 
answer.” (T.G. Jones, 1992, 𝜒2 = 27) 
4.  Manipulation issues imply that results of a referendum could easily be manipulated by 
politicians, the media or by the people themselves, e.g. “This referendum has nothing to do 
with asking the British people what they think about this issue but with getting the Prime 
Minister and his skin through the next general election.” (J. Maples, 2004, 𝜒2 = 19) 
[Table 3 about here] 
By identifying the most frequent key terms associated with our issue of interest, this 
exploratory phase enabled us to reduce the large amount of information pertaining to the case against 
referendums (1172 gauged sentences) to four major lines of argumentation. In other words, before 
moving on to a more interpretative phase of the analysis, this first phase enabled us to identify key 
recurring patterns in the data. 
We proceed now to the results of the analysis using NVivo to assess the diversity and salience 
of the arguments voiced by MPs. The four categories of arguments that we derived from Alceste’s 
automatic extraction are the starting point of our subsequent analysis. Within these categories we 
identified 29 sub-categories of arguments, which are summarised in Table 4.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Our results indicate that from the 1970s to the 2010s the four categories of rhetorical 
strategies identified above have framed the case against direct participation (see Fig. 2). In each 
decade, MPs invoked arguments of each type and, while practical arguments increased relatively in 
salience in the 1990s and early 2000s, institutional arguments are regularly put forward in all debates, 
returning in 2010 to the most preferred type of argument (Table 5). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
What has changed over time, however, is the array of arguments representatives use to argue 
against citizens’ participation within those four categories. While 25 different reasons were invoked to 
counter the use of the referendum in debates in the 1970s, this dropped to 10 reasons in 2010, as 
depicted in Fig. 3. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Constituting 42% of all arguments against direct participation across all debates, institutional 
arguments are the most common type of anti-referendum argument of UK MPs. In the 1970s, the 
Burkean case against the referendum was structured around two main institutional issues: (1) the 
claim that referendums weaken the role of Parliament and (2) the fear that they would set a precedent 
if introduced to the British political system. Also common was the belief that direct decision-making 
might jeopardise relationships between constituents and their elected representatives. In the 1980s, 
one of the main recurring points was simply that Parliament is responsible for making decisions on 
behalf of the electorate. The same argument also came top of the list in the 1990s. Critics of the 
referendum typically argued that if Parliament, after debating the question of the Maastricht 
ratification at length, was to refer the decision to the people, this would entail, as Conservative MP 
Tristan Garel-Jones put it, a ‘dereliction’ of duty on the part of political representatives. 
In the 2000s, the institutional case against the referendum underwent a slight shift with two 
arguments becoming prominent: (1) referendums are only justified by substantial changes in the 
Constitution and (2) referendums were not held on previous matters of crucial importance. Labour 
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MPs Sir Stuart Bell and Marc Lazarowicz, for example, emphasised that the decision by Labour not to 
call a referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty was perfectly legitimate given that former 
Conservative governments did not submit earlier European Treaties (such as Maastricht) to a 
referendum. Labour MPs, such as Chris Bryant, also emphasised that a referendum on the EU 
Constitution was unnecessary because the Treaty did not entail substantial changes to the way Britain 
would be governed. The same argument was also commonly expressed in 2010. Even for referendum 
supporters embracing a Lockean view of democracy (e.g. William Hague), some issues, such as future 
enlargement of the EU, were too mundane to deserve a referendum. All in all, the three paradigmatic 
institutional arguments identified here – namely, that referendums weaken the role of Parliament, 
undermine the responsibility vested in political representatives and contravene the UK tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty – were echoed in 2010. By contrast, the claim that a referendum would 
jeopardise relationships between constituents and elected representatives had disappeared from the 
repertoire of arguments. 
Over time, practical arguments have been the second most prominent type of argument 
expressed by MPs against the use of the referendum, making up 26% of all instances. In the 1970s, 
critics of direct participation objected that people did not want or care about referendums, preferring 
elected representatives to make decisions on their behalf. This view was often associated with the 
claim that complex issues require expertise and are not amenable to a Yes or No answer. Difficulty in 
finding an appropriate time to hold a referendum in addition to challenges of organisation and cost 
were also mentioned. Absent from the debates in the 1980s, practical arguments reappeared in the 
1990s. For referendum opponents such as Anthony Nelson, referendums are often defective not only 
because intricate political matters cannot be decided by reducing them to a Yes or No question, but 
also because they are only ‘snapshots’ of public opinion, which is susceptible to change. Issues 
pertaining to citizens' lack of expertise and their willingness to let elected representatives decide on 
their behalf were also mentioned along with the difficulty of finding an appropriate time to call a 
referendum. In the 2000s, the question of whether acceptance of the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe could be determined by a Yes or No answer was raised and established as an essential 
precondition for deferring decision-making to the people. Furthermore, arguments about the 
‘complexity of the text’ under consideration were at times complemented by concerns about the 
ability of voters to make informed political choices. Though rare, the argument that the people lack 
the requisite knowledge to adequately take part in decision-making was still made in 2003-2004. For 
Labour MP Chris Bryant, for instance: ‘Although a referendum might be appropriate for Pop Idol 
when deciding whether Gareth Gates or Will Young should win, it is unsuitable for examining a 
treaty’.5 A further technical issue was the ‘timing’ of a referendum. During the second reading of the 
Bill, critics typically argued that the organisation of a referendum would delay the ratification process 
considerably. In 2010, except for very occasional issues pertaining to the cost and organisation of a 
referendum, practical arguments were rarely invoked. 
Manipulation issues constitute the third most frequent category of arguments against the 
referendum invoked by MPs, at 24% of all instances. In the 1970s, parliamentarians worried that the 
framing of the question would have a considerable influence on the results. Drawing on the French 
experience with direct democracy, they also feared that people would not answer the question, but 
instead use the referendum as a means of evaluating the performance of the government. In addition, 
critics emphasised that dictators often utilised referendums with perverted effects. Understandably, 
perhaps, an important claim in the 1970s was that the Labour party leader only advocated a 
referendum to resolve internal divisions and keep the party together. The range of potential 
manipulation issues extended to at least two important concerns during that decade, namely that 
referendums reinforce the status quo and that the media would influence the results. 
The 1980s saw an upsurge of criticisms pertaining to the potential manipulative effect that 
discrepancies in funding could have on the results of a referendum (categorised as other manipulation 
issues). Some critics were eager to point out that the 1975 campaign in favour of the referendum led 
by the Labour Government had benefitted from more funding than the ‘no’ campaign. Others pointed 
out that the public had been misled by the nature of the ‘deal’ Britain was signing up to in accepting 
continued membership of the EU, asking that the result of the 1975 referendum be reconsidered. 
                                                     
5
 HC Deb 12 Nov 2003 c310. 
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While some MPs were demanding that a new referendum be held, opponents countered that this was 
simply a Eurosceptic manoeuvre to take the UK out of the EU.  
In the 1990s, the claim that the framing of the question would influence the results 
reappeared, along with the claim that the media may influence the outcome of the vote. In the 2000s 
an important point of contention between advocates and opponents of the referendum pertained to the 
wording of the question to be put to the electorate. During the Second Reading of the Referendum 
Bill, a major objection of Labour MPs was that the Bill remained unclear as to who would draft the 
question. In the same debates, referendum critics often alleged that advocates simply instrumentalise 
the device to appeal to the people in terms of putting pressure on the government and also, assuming a 
‘no’ result, to bring about British withdrawal from the EU. Less frequently than in previous decades, 
manipulation issues were still being mentioned in 2010. Critics of the referendum in this debate were 
keen to re-emphasise that supporters of the device sought a withdrawal from the EU. The old claim 
that referendums are tools for dictators still found resonance. 
Finally, constituting 8% of all anti-referendum arguments in the corpus, political arguments 
were especially popular in early discussions, but they lost salience in subsequent debates. In the 
1970s, MPs were particularly concerned that deferring decision-making to the people might put the 
Government at risk if the electorate cast a vote opposing the governmental line. Drawing on the 
Norwegian case, Conservative MP Tim Renton warned that if a referendum result went against the 
Government, it would have to resign. Often expressed as well was the fear that referendums put 
political parties at risk. Drawing again on the example of Norway, Renton maintained that direct 
participation diminishes the authority of political elites, leads to a lack of decisiveness by political 
leaders through fear of public reaction and causes alienation between political parties and the public. 
An important concern at the time – and one which would prove prescient – was that holding 
referendums would stimulate demands for devolution in Scotland and Wales.  
Absent from the 1980s debates, political arguments reappeared in the 1990s. Once again, the 
fear that a referendum might put the Government at risk was expressed, albeit less recurrently than in 
the 1970s. An important political argument that emerged in the 1990s (categorised as other political 
argument) was that a referendum would be redundant because the manifestos of the main parties in 
1992 had clearly stated their commitment to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, providing sufficient 
information on the matter for voters to understand and make up their minds. Over the last two 
decades, the claim that referendums put governments at risk was made episodically in Parliament; all 
the other political arguments identified above were almost never expressed. 
4 Discussion 
Overall, our results show that the range of claims used by elected representatives to argue 
against direct participation on European matters has narrowed, although the arguments have 
consistently fallen into the same four argumentation types, with institutional arguments predominant. 
Our results have important implications for the academic debate on direct participation. 
First, one noticeable feature of the academic debate on the referendum is that the issue is now 
discussed on technical rather than normative grounds. Seeking to address the traditional criticisms of 
referendums, recent studies have intended to assess whether people were sufficiently informed to 
make political decisions (Haskell 2001; Magleby 1984; Lupia 1994) and whether they would be 
willing to participate on a more regular basis (Dalton et al. 2001). Crucially, they have focused on 
how new technologies could help with implementing certain forms of direct participation (Grossman 
1995; Barber 1984; Toffler 1995). While in 1996 Ian Budge argued that ‘the new challenge of direct 
democracy lies in the fact that it is now technically possible to bring citizens together to discuss public 
policy’, which ‘destroys the killer argument habitually used to knock direct democracy on the head’ 
(1996: 1), our results suggest that the ‘killer argument’ typically advanced by representatives is that 
elections put them (i.e. representatives) in a legitimate position to make political decisions on behalf 
of the people. Hence, even if the existence of electronic communications means that physical 
proximity is no longer required for people to participate in decisions, it does not follow that 
representatives would concede to or facilitate their doing so.  
Second, a recurring argument for using the referendum as a supplement to representative 
institutions is based on studies showing that most people regard referendums to be the least mediated 
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of all possible expressions of the popular will (Jahn and Storsved 1995: 25). Contemporary advocates 
argue that the direct process of popular decision-making via referendums has a legitimacy that 
indirect decisions made by elected representatives cannot match (Grande 2000; Weiler 1997). 
However, the debates analysed here show that the referendum is often perceived to be a strategic 
instrument to achieve political ends rather than a device for strengthening democracy. Even if 
parliamentarians accept the legitimacy of the decisions arrived at via referendums, they repeatedly 
raise concerns about the legitimacy of the process itself (classified as manipulation issues in our 
study). This finding is consistent with rationalist/strategic accounts of direct participation, which inter 
alia find that referendums are used to achieve party-political advantage and not held out of 
commitment to the principle of popular sovereignty or the belief that citizen participation is of value 
(Bogdanor 1994; Dür and Mateo 2011; Putnam 1988; Pierson 2000; Butler and Ranney 1994, King 
2007). It is also in line with recent interpretations of why Prime Minister David Cameron promised a 
referendum on the UK's membership of the EU, a move perceived less as an endorsement of 
participatory values by the political elite and more as a political manoeuvre to appease Eurosceptic 
backbenchers within the Conservative Party (Emerson 2013; Grant 2013; Priestley 2013).  
An implication of our finding that institutional arguments against the referendum consistently 
predominate over the other types of argument is that many MPs perceive their role as one of making 
decisions on behalf of the people and are deeply influenced by the view that politics is a division of 
labour. Indeed, it is precisely because an issue is of paradigmatic importance that, according to 
referendum critics, Parliament should remain the locus of decision-making. This finding shows the 
persistent appeal of Burke’s view of representative democracy. 
Parliament did agree to allow citizens to vote on the question of continued membership of the 
EU in 1975, but it did not intend to set a precedent. Afterwards, the referendum continued to be 
viewed with suspicion as being both ‘un-British and unconstitutional’. Politicians also avoided giving 
a say to people on European matters out of belief that doing so would roll back the cumulative 
political and economic achievements of the European project and forestall further integration. Until 
the 1990s it was not particularly unusual even for politicians publicly to express this view. For a long 
time, the choice between realising participatory ideals and advancing the European project was a 
political dilemma, to which Lord Holme of Cheltenham gave expression in the debate on the 
Maastricht Treaty: 
As one who supports referenda but who even more anxiously supports the EU, I say, 
in the words of Isaiah Berlin, that not all good things are compatible and that for me, 
and perhaps for some of my noble friends, progress towards the EU matters more.
6
  
But denying the people the right to express themselves on a fundamental issue was 
increasingly difficult for MPs over time as the context changed. Citizens became better educated and 
informed on political issues (see Barber 1984; Budge 1996; Grossman 1995). In the same period, 
parliamentary prerogatives were being steadily eroded ‘from below’ (e.g., through the process of 
devolution to regional parliaments) and ‘from above’ (i.e., through the transfer of sovereignty to 
supranational institutions such as the EU). Since the end of the so-called permissive consensus in the 
1990s (Lindbergh and Scheingold 1970), there has been a growing recognition of the need to involve 
national citizens in EU decision-making on a more regular basis (Wallace and Smith 1995). Some 
analysts characterise this change as a shift from output legitimacy, i.e. the ability of EU institutions to 
deliver policy outcomes, to input legitimacy, i.e. the ability of citizens to contribute to decisions (see 
Scharpf 1999; Lindgren and Persson 2010). The recognition of the need for popular consultation has 
been reflected in the election manifestos of major political parties in the UK, Germany and France 
since the late 1990s (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003; Allen and Mirwaldt 2010), the latest example being 
Cameron’s pledge to hold a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU in June 2016. 
These observations receive some corroboration in the findings of this study. First, it is 
proving increasingly difficult for critics of the referendum to argue that EU matters are too mundane 
to merit deferring decision-making to the people. Rather, partially transferring British sovereignty to 
the EU without popular consultation is now more and more viewed as a being disloyal to the people. 
Second, despite the prominence and recurrence of institutional arguments, the argument that 
                                                     
6
 HL Deb 14 July 1993 c267 
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referendums threaten the traditional relationship between constituents and elected representatives has 
lost currency. Third, we find a reduction over time in the arguments that people are not informed 
enough to make decisions and do not want or care about referendums. 
Hence, although many MPs still perceive their role as one of making decisions on behalf of 
the people, their view – at least as reflected in the arguments they deploy – is attenuated by 
acknowledgement that fundamental legislation should not be passed against the will of the people. 
The reduction in the range of institutional arguments suggests that although MPs may oppose 
referendums for reasons founded in the Burkean view of parliamentary representation, the Lockean 
view that Parliament is not all-powerful and direct participation has a modest role in checking 
Parliamentary power is gaining ground.  
5 Conclusion and avenues for further research 
Using a summative approach to content analysis, our study captures the variety of arguments 
in the UK Parliament levelled against direct participation on EU matters over the last four decades 
and reveals (1) a steady decrease in the range of arguments used, (2) a constant framing of the case 
against referendums around four key argumentative strategies, and (3) predominant use of 
institutional arguments over arguments citing practical, manipulation and political concerns.  
The typology of arguments developed here could be used in a classical (quantitative) content 
analysis to test whether specific variables (i.e. party affiliation, affiliated party in opposition or 
government, constituency location in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, etc.) are 
associated with the types of argument expressed by speakers. Drawing on a larger sample of data and 
using techniques such as document scaling, for instance, would open possibilities for predicting 
(rather than describing) the arguments likely to be espoused by political representatives in debates 
(see Lowe et. al 2011; Herzog and Benoit 2013). 
Our taxonomy of arguments could also be tested and elaborated upon in a comparative 
perspective. While in the UK, sovereignty has traditionally been based upon the role of Parliament, 
this is not the case in other EU countries such as France, which has a political tradition where the 
people are the source of sovereignty. Using a form of directed content analysis (see Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005), further research could assess how direct participation on European matters is 
considered according to different democratic traditions. Another important question that could be 
addressed comparatively is whether the case against direct participation on EU matters differs from 
that on non-EU matters. After all, opponents of local or devolution referendums have gradually (and 
almost totally) lost ground in the UK Parliament. As suggested above, the objection might be less 
with direct participation itself and more with direct participation on EU issues specifically.  
Finally, an important body of work is now devoted to the analysis of deliberative practices in 
democratic institutions (see Steiner et al. 2004; Bächtiger 2005; Weale et al. 2012). A central question 
raised in these studies is whether partisans in national legislatures practice reciprocity in political 
debates or talk past one another. Using argumentation analysis (see in particular the model developed 
by Toulmin 1969), further studies could assess whether partisans and opponents of EU referendums 
‘speak the same language’ or whether their arguments are irreconcilable.  
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Appendix 
Table 1 Commons debates included in analysis 
Date Hansard reference Initiator Government Topic 
 
22 November 
1974 
 
 
HC Deb 22 November 
1974 vol 881 cc1687-
771 
 
Tim Renton 
(Conservative) 
 
Labour 
(Wilson) 
 
Continued 
Membership of 
the EU 
 
21 May 1980 
 
 
HC Deb 21 May 1980 vol 
985 cc507-15 
 
Dennis Canavan 
(Labour) 
 
Conservative 
(Thatcher) 
 
Continued 
Membership of 
the EU 
 
12 November 
1982 
 
 
HC Deb 12 November 
1982 vol 31 cc769-828 
 
Malcolm Rifkind 
(Conservative) 
 
Conservative 
(Thatcher) 
 
Continued 
Membership of 
the EU 
 
21 February 
1992 
 
 
HC Deb 21 February 
1992 vol 204 cc581-650 
 
Richard Shepherd 
(Conservative) 
 
Conservative 
(Major) 
 
Ratification of the 
Maastricht 
Treaty 
 
12 November 
2003 
 
 
HC Deb 12 November 
2003 vol 413 cc307 
 
John Maples 
(Conservative) 
 
Labour (Blair) 
 
Ratification of the 
EU Constitution 
 
23 April 2004 
 
 
HC Deb 23 April 2004 
vol 420 cc565-608 
 
John Maples 
(Conservative) 
 
Labour (Blair) 
 
Ratification of the 
EU Constitution 
 
7 December 
2010 
 
 
HC Deb 7 December 
2010 vol 517 cc191-273 
 
William Hague 
(Conservative) 
 
Conservative/
Lib Dem 
(Cameron) 
 
Transfer of 
National Power 
to the EU 
 
 
Figure 1 Hierarchical descending clustering of classes produced by Alceste 
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Table 2 Classes derived by Alceste from all debates combined and their first 10 ley terms 
according to χ2 value 
Classes No. 
Sentences 
(% of total) 
First 10 key terms 
Judicial issues  655 
(18%) 
power (χ2 452); law (χ2353);  court (χ2287);  EU (χ2224);  transfer 
(χ2213);  sovereign (χ2162); clause (χ2159);  competence (χ2149); 
justice (χ2143);  bill (χ2135) 
Constitutional 
issues 
261 
(7%) 
treaty (χ2290); qualified (χ2290);voting (χ2285); pillar (χ2225); rome 
(χ2192); foreign (χ2185); union (χ2183);maastricht (χ2177);  
superstate (χ2145); majority (χ2130) 
Procedural 
language 
868 
(23%) 
hon (χ2970) friend (χ2470) member (χ2466) mr (χ2424) gentleman 
(χ2142) I (χ2140) avon (χ2135) stratford (χ2135) he (χ2119) speech 
(χ2118) 
Referendum 
issue 
1172 
(32%) 
election (χ2285); referendum (χ2191); people (χ2185); electoral 
(χ2163); question (χ2131); general (χ2104); issue (χ296); referenda 
(χ296); part (χ295); answer (χ293) 
Economic 
issues 
381 
(10%) 
community (χ2348); operation (χ2192); trade (χ2188); countries 
(χ2184); trade (χ2140); budget (χ2140); develop (χ2125); fund 
(χ2122); economic (χ2115);currency (χ294) 
Agricultural 
issues 
365 
(10%) 
food (χ2359); manufacture (χ2304); price (χ2283); agricultural 
(χ2258); industry (χ2257); farm (χ2247); cheap χ2 (193); cost 
(χ2179); market (χ2173); export (χ2156) 
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Table 3 Referendum Issue class: first 10 arguments against the use of the referendum 
according to χ2 value 
Arguments against the referendum (Key Terms in Bold) χ2 
value 
Speaker 
(party) 
Year 
The norwegian parliament decided against it because the issue was 
too complicated. In 1972, the norwegian referendum was held, 
but the result went against the labour government, who resigned. 
28 T. Renton 
(CON) 
1974 
I am going on to set out my argument, which I want to do briefly, 
which answers the hon. gentleman' s question. however, we have 
just had a general election which, in part, asked the electorate 
whether it wished this issue to be decided in the ballot box. 
27 D. Jay 
(LAB) 
1974 
Even on such an apparently simple issue as in or out of the 
community, could the wording of the question sufficiently affect 
the answer. Opinion polls were held prior to the referendum to 
try to find out whether that was so. 
27 T.G. Jones 
(CON) 
1992 
In the end, as we know, the referendum proved de_gaulle_s own 
undoing, as he went to the country on an issue of senate and local 
government reform. 
23 T. Renton 
(CON) 
1974 
In 1972 the labour government in norway made it plain that, 
although the referendum they held on 
european_economic_community membership was officially 
consultative only, they would accept the result as binding. 
21 T. Renton 
(CON) 
1974 
They may be wrong in that, but that is the view of some people. the 
scottish and welsh situations are in the same category. once the 
precedent of a referendum on a constitutional matter is decided, 
wales and scotland could ask for a referendum and why not 
durham, too? 
21 W. Hamilton 
(LAB) 
1974 
Fourthly, there have been objections on the grounds I accept that 
there is some validity in these of difficulty in formulating the 
question in an objective, unpartisan way. 
21 E. Luard 
(LAB) 
1974 
I shall analyse that referendum and some of the questions, problems 
and difficulties that arise from it. one matter is how to make sure 
that the electorate is fully informed when asked to judge, in the 
simple yes no, in out way, a complex nexus of issues. 
16 T.G. Jones 
(CON) 
1992 
The third objection is that the referendum will bind successor 
governments or even successor parliaments. 
14 N. Ridley 
(CON) 
1974 
I repeat what has been said over and over again. we are committed 
as a party to the opportunity of making a decision in a general 
election. 
14 A. Nelson 
(CON) 
1992 
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Table 4 Categories and sub-categories of arguments against referendums and their frequency 
in the corpus 
Categories Sub-categories No. of coded 
segments 
Institutional 
arguments 
Referendums go against the tradition of parliamentary democracy 59 
Referendums are only justified by substantial changes in the Constitution 11 
Holding a referendum would set a precedent 10 
Referendums were not held on other matters of crucial importance 9 
Referendum are binding 8 
Referendums jeopardise relationship between constituents and elected 
representatives 
2 
Other institutional arguments 0 
 Sub-total (% total) 99 (42%) 
Practical 
arguments 
 
Complex issues cannot be reduced to yes/no answers 13 
Timing 9 
People do not want or care about referendums 7 
Referendum are expensive 6 
Referendums only provide a snapshot of public opinion 6 
People are not informed enough to make decisions 5 
Referendums do not provide clear cut answers 5 
Complex issues require expertise 2 
Other practical arguments 8 
 Sub-total (% total) 61 (26%) 
Manipulation 
issues 
The framing of the question would influence the vote 19 
Referendums are advocated by party leaders to keep their party together 8 
Referendums are tools of dictators 6 
Referendums are used by people as a vote of confidence 5 
Referendums are only advocated by those who want to take the UK out of 
the EU 
4 
The media would influence the vote 3 
Referendums reinforce the status quo 2 
Other manipulation issues 11 
 Sub-total (% total) 58 (24%) 
Political 
arguments  
Referendums put the Government at risk 7 
Referendums put political parties at risk 6 
Referendums would increase the power of the executive 1 
Referendums would open demands for devolution 1 
Other political arguments 4 
 Sub-total (% total) 19 (8%) 
 Total Instances of Arguments 237 (100%) 
19 
 
Figure 2 Relative frequency of anti-referendum arguments by category in debates by decade 
 
Table 5 Categories and sub-categories of arguments coded with NVivo  
Categories Sub-categories Examples References 
Institutional 
arguments 
Referendums are 
binding. 
The referendum will bind successor Governments or 
even successor Parliaments. 
*name_NRidley 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums are only 
justified by 
substantial changes 
in the Constitution. 
Referenda should be advanced only when a substantial 
change in how we are to be governed is being 
proposed. If the ink is not yet dry on the document, 
how can the Conservatives already call for a 
referendum? They do not know whether the 
constitution will involve a substantial change. 
*name_CBryant 
*year_2003 
*party_LAB 
Referendums were 
not held on other 
matters of crucial 
importance. 
The treaty about which we are concerned is more 
profound than others. It provides for legislation in 
all the national Parliaments, but it is no more 
terrifying for that. It flows from the original Stuttgart 
declaration and the Single European Act when there 
was no question of a referendum.  
*name_HDykes 
*year_1992 
*party_CON 
Holding a referendum 
would set a 
precedent. 
 
Once the principle of holding a national referendum 
had been introduced it would be abundantly plain 
that pressure groups, from within parliament and 
from without, would demand further referenda from 
successive governments.  
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums go 
against the tradition 
of Parliamentary 
democracy. 
The holding of national referenda to decide issues of 
importance runs contrary to the principle of British 
parliamentary democracy. 
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums 
jeopardize 
relationship between 
constituents and 
elected 
representatives. 
If these [referenda] are introduced in our country they 
will have a profound and lasting effect on the 
relationship between Members of Parliament and the 
electorate. 
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Other Institutional 
Arguments 
What are the implications of holding a referendum? 
Will two kinds of law be developed, on the one hand 
laws that are ratified by the people and, on the other, 
laws that are made only by Parliament? 
*name_JMoore 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Practical 
arguments 
Referendums are 
expensive 
We must recognise that the cost of and the organisation 
for a referendum are not inconsiderable factors. It is 
as well to be open about this and not to pretend that 
there are  no liabilities and that a referendum is just 
an asset.  
*name_GFowler 
*year_1974 
*party_LAB 
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Complex issues 
cannot be reduced to 
yes/no answers 
We demean the people in supposing that we can devise 
a question which merits a yes or no answer. The 
people's attitudes and views on the Common Market 
are far too complex to merit a simple "Yes" or "No". 
*name_JMoore 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums do not 
provide clear/cut 
answers 
If the referendum is held, it will still not settle the 
question of membership, because decision in such a 
matter will continue to have to be reviewed, month 
after month and  year after year. Some Governments 
will want to stay in, whilst others will be doubtful. 
Some will want to renegotiate, some will not.  
*name_DWeitzman 
*year_1974 
*party_LAB 
People do not want or 
care about 
referendums.  
Do the British people really want that? The only pool 
figures that I have seen, taken in the middle of 1974, 
showed that a majority of the electorate sampled 
certainly wanted a referendum, although even more 
would have preferred the decision to be taken at a 
General Election. 
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Timing I deplore the timing of the proposed referendum on the 
question of our staying in the European Economic 
Community …) I regret that the Labour Party has 
tied itself quite so closely in the timing that it has put 
forward for a decision through the ballot box by 
saying that the decision must be reached within 12 
months from last October. 
*name_PGoodhart 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
People are not 
informed enough to 
make decisions 
(75 per cent of the electors) sampled said that they did 
not feel that they were well enough informed to vote 
in a referendum on the European Economic 
Community. Only 18 per cent felt that they were. 
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums only 
provide a snapshot of 
public opinion 
Referendums are often defective because they are 
snapshots of public opinion and public opinion 
moves on. I believe that, on the EC and its 
development, opinions have changed not just among 
the public but in the House. 
*name_ANelson 
*year_1992 
*party_CON 
Complex issues 
require expertise 
The larger the magnitude of the question, the more 
reason for its being decided by members of 
parliament who are elected to take these decisions 
and who, through weeks of poring over documents 
and studying issues, become expert on the subject, 
who listen and participate in debates, and who 
finally cast their vote. 
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Other practical 
arguments 
Someone from Ireland might end up having two votes. 
They could be registered in Ireland to vote in 
domestic Irish elections. They would therefore have 
a vote in the Irish referendum, but they could be 
registered here for European elections because they 
lived here and paid taxes. They could therefore vote 
in two referendums and, although that might be a 
good thing, it is a bit odd. 
*name_DCairns 
*year_2004 
*party_LAB 
Manipulation 
issues 
The framing of the 
question would 
influence the vote. 
It is highly significant that in all the debate that is now 
developing on the subject of a referendum on our 
continued membership of the European Economic 
Community the question is  not whether we should 
have the referendum but on how the question should 
be framed in order to obtain the answer that the 
executive wants.  
*name_WHamilton 
*year1974 
*party_LAB 
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Referendums 
reinforce status-quo. 
If my hon. Friends will look at the historical 
precedents they will find that the referendum has 
been shown in the past to be an instrument of 
conservatism at best a mechanism to maintain the 
status quo and at worst to put the clock back.  
*name_WHamilton 
*year1974 
*party_LAB 
Referendums are 
only advocated by 
those who want to 
take the UK at out 
the EU. 
I imagine that many of those who support the Bill hope 
that, if the matter were put to a referendum, the 
British public would say a firm no. Do they really 
believe that by going it alone and not taking part in 
the economic and political development of the 
European Community we shall enhance our 
sovereignty? What sort of world are we living in? 
*name_ANelson 
*year_1992 
*party_CON 
Referendums are 
advocated by party 
leaders to keep their 
party together. 
The referendum proposal by the Labour Party is a 
transparent attempt to preserve party unity at 
whatever costs, including the cost of prejudicing 
Britain's proper role in Europe through prolonged 
uncertainty. 
*name_DLane 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums are 
used by people as a 
vote of confidence. 
The referendum is a fallible instrument. We cannot be 
sure that people will vote on the merits of the issue. 
We cannot be sure that they will not be swayed by 
other Considerations, whether party political 
allegiances or the popularity or unpopularity of the 
Government, or whatever else it may be. So there is 
the possibility of a perverse answer. 
*name_DLane 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums are 
tools of dictators. 
On the very day that Hitler announced Germany’s 
withdrawal from the league of nations, he said that 
he would subject his decision to a plebiscite, using 
the semblance of democracy to thwart the 
democratic nations. A total of 96 per cent. of the 
electorate went to the poll, and 95 per cent approved 
Hitler’s policy. 
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
The Media would 
influence the vote. 
I do not wish to refer to Hitler or Stalin, but there is no 
question in my mind that, given the means of control 
of the media in a modern Western style democracy, 
one can utilise the media to get the answer one 
wants. That is one of the awesome realities of 
Western society. 
*name_JMoore 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Other manipulation 
issues 
Does my right hon. Friend accept that the referendum 
will not be a defence unless there are clear rules to 
prevent one side from pouring millions of pounds 
into its campaign, which in 1975 resulted in a 
prejudiced, biased, unfair provision of information 
for people to make a judgment?  
*name_DStoddart  
*year_1982 
*party_LAB 
Political 
arguments 
Referendums put the 
Government at risk. 
In 1972, the Norwegian referendum was held, but the 
results went against the Labour Government, who 
resigned. 
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums would 
open demand for 
devolution. 
There are many labour members who feel, as I do, that 
the next demand for a referendum would come from 
the Scottish nationals, who would seek it on the 
subject of independence for Scotland, followed, 
perhaps, by one for Wales. 
*name_NRidley 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Referendums would 
increase the power of 
the executive. 
(…) in our country, without any written constitution, 
there are limitless opportunities for further referenda 
and each would place more power in the hands of 
the government of the day. 
*name_HDykes 
*year_1992 
*party_CON 
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Referendums put 
political parties at 
risk.  
As Norwegians today accept, it [the referendum] 
diminished the authority of political leaders, it has 
led to a lack of decisiveness by their political leaders 
through fear of public reaction, and it has led to a 
growing alienation between the political parties and 
the public. 
*name_TRenton 
*year_1974 
*party_CON 
Other political 
arguments 
In a general election, people have an opportunity to 
consider all Government policies, while in a 
referendum people have an opportunity to consider 
only one, but one that might have implications for 
the rest of the Government policy. That is why there 
should generally be a self-denying ordinance 
exercised in respect of referendums. 
*name_RShepherd 
*year_1992 
*party_CON 
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Figure 3 Frequency of anti-referendum arguments by type in debates by decade 
 
